Much of present-day epistemology is divided between internalists and externalists. Different as these views are, they have in common that they strip justification from its dialectical component in order to block the skeptic’s argument from disagreement. That is, they allow that one may have justified beliefs even if one is not able to defend it against challenges and resolve the disagreements about them. Lammenranta (2008, 2011a) recently argued that neither internalism nor externalism convinces if we consider the argument in its (...) most interesting format. In this paper I zoom in on this debate, and fix further details of Lammenranta’s lead. Specifically, I will side with skepticism that justification is dialectical, yet only if certain conditions are in place. (shrink)

In the Critique of Gotha Programme, Karl Marx famously argues that a communist society will be characterised by the principle, ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ I take up a question about this principle that was originally posed by G.A. Cohen, namely: what makes communism (so conceived) possible for Marx? In reply to this question, Cohen interprets Marx as saying that communism is possible because of limitless abundance, a view that Cohen takes to be (...) implausible for ecological reasons. I develop a new interpretation of Marx's position. On this interpretation, people in communist society achieve self-realisation through providing others with the goods and services required for their self-realisation. Coupled with a reasonably high (but not immense) development of productive power, self-realisation generates conditions in which people can produce according to their abilities and receive according to their needs. I defend this view as an interpretation of Marx and I argue that it represents a more plausible account of what makes communism possible than Cohen's interpretation in which technological advance and limitless abundance play the predominant role. (shrink)

The paper examines the interplays between logic and politics in the Polish School of Logic starting from 1914. The Polish School of Logic flourished between 1920 and 1939. Philosophically, it was influenced by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938). For Twardowski logic is fundamental for every kind of human activity, professional and private and this means that every argument should be formulated and proceed by correct inferential rules. These rules involve semiotics, formal logic and methodology of science. The paper shows how this position (...) was shared by Twardowski’s students, including Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz Kotrabiński, as well as by the next generation of logicians and philosophers and especially by Alfred Tarski. These authors considered logic, philosophy and science as completely neutral with respect to politics and ideology but they also considered logical skills as indispensable in political activities. (shrink)

Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one (...) discovers what an authority believes, it is not permissible to rely on any of one’s own reasons concerning the subject matter. The original version of this view, as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, has recently been severely criticized for recommending blind trust and for abandoning even minimal standards for critical thinking. In our paper, we defend a new version of the Preemption View—Defeatist Preemptionism—in a way that differs radically from Zagzebski’s. We argue that our view can be derived from certain widely accepted general epistemic principles. In particular, we claim that preemption can be identified as a special case of source sensitive defeat. Moreover, we argue that Defeatist Preemptionism does not lead to the undesirable consequences that critics ascribe to the Preemption View. The paper thus articulates the foundations and refinements of the Preemption View, such that it adequately captures the phenomenon of epistemic authority and the rational requirements related to it. (shrink)

According to Vallicella's 'Relations, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley's Regress' (2002), if relations are to relate their relata, some special operator must do the relating. No other options will do. In this paper we reject Vallicella's conclusion by considering an important option that becomes visible only if we hold onto a precise distinction between the following three feature-pairs of relations: internality/externality, universality/particularity, relata-specificity/relata-unspecificity. The conclusion we reach is that if external relations are to relate their relata, they must be (...) relata-specific (and no special operator is needed). As it eschews unmereological complexes, this outcome is of relevance to defenders of the extensionality of composition. (shrink)

This paper investigates the viability of the Bayesian model of belief change. Van Benthem (2003) has shown that a particular kind of information change typical for dynamic epistemic logic cannot be modelled by Bayesian conditioning. I argue that the problems described by van Benthem come about because the information change alters the semantics in which the change is supposed to be modelled by conditioning: it induces a shift in meanings. I then show that meaning shifts can be modelled in terms (...) of conditioning by employing a semantics that makes these changes in meaning explicit, and that the appropriate probability kinematics can be described by Dempster’s rule. The new model thereby facilitates a better understanding between probabilistic epistemology and dynamic epistemic logic. (shrink)

In the context of the current discussion about the ethical boundaries of humor, the study attempts to show that an approach based on Mukařovský’s functional theory is not only applicable to the discussion but also competitive. In the first part of the article, the author tries to answer the question of inserting a joke into the field of functions. He understands a joke as a sign that has in its most typical version a dominant f ictive-communicative function. It is precisely (...) in the dominance of the fictive-communicative function of the joke that he sees the reason for the borderline position of the joke between art and life. The fictiveness of jokes creates, on the one hand, the impression that they have as fictitious statements greater independence from nonaesthetic norms, similar to what works of art have. On the other hand, because of the communicative moment jokes have more potential to offend us than do artifacts with a dominant aesthetic function. The second part of the study is dedicated to the relationship between the joke and the listener and attempts to describe other forms in which the semantic energy of the joke can reveal itself. (shrink)

Zsfassung in dt. und engl. Sprache. - Dt. Zsfassung u.d.T.: Fragen und Perspektiven des Transzendentalismus.

In a famous passage in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant calls the “spirit” an animating or enlivening principle in the mind. Rather than a positive affirmation building on a protobiological background, this definition marks an aesthetic notion of life. As a first step, the “Gemüt” shows itself to be an ambivalent concept between transcendental philosophy and anthropology. This ambivalence then reoccurs in the notion of life in an aesthetical regard: Life in this sense is the one hand (...) bound to the empirical notion of the powers of life – and thereby to the pre-critical works – but is now turned into something surpassing. Life in aesthetical terms is negatively bound to life in an empirical sense. So is spirit, too: It rather works as a negatively defined principle opening up the given. Life, Gemüt, and spirit make up a relational constellation that provides the grounds for the work of aesthetic ideas. By means of aesthetic ideas, spirit opens up the cognitive and thereby enlivens the Gemüt. This principle, which is spirit, can then be understood as following Kant’s logic of the infinite judgment, because the aesthetic is the opening of the rational to its indeterminate other. (shrink)

The paper deals with the work Philosophia Sacra: Or The Principles of Natural Philosophy. Extracted from Divine Revelation, published in 1753 by the relatively unknown English clergyman Samuel Pike (circa 1717 – 1773). This work falls within the tradition of the so-called Mosaic physics, a specific Early Modern endeavor to build natural philosophy based on a literal reading of the Holy Scriptures, particularly the first chapters of the book of Genesis attributed to Moses – hence the term “Mosaic.” For this (...) reason, at the beginning of the paper, the author seeks to introduce the fundamental ideas of this movement as expressed by its key proponents, namely L. Daneau, O. Casmann, and K. Aslakssøn. In the subsequent analysis of Pike’s natural-philosophical conception, the author highlights its specific features, including obvious Newtonian influences on the one hand (Pike’s work was written about a century and a half later than the texts of the ‘founding fathers’ of Mosaic physics and must have been influenced by the contemporary discourse). On the other hand, Pike’s work exhibits strong, albeit implicit, similarities with the ideas of J. A. Comenius, another thinker associated with Early Modern Mosaic physics (and often considered its most significant representative, which are explored in the concluding part of the text. It can be said that Pike’s work appears as a remarkable and highly original culmination of the Mosaic natural philosophy tradition, combining a range of seemingly unexpected, if not outright contradictory, motifs. (shrink)

de Finetti's representation theorem of exchangeable probabilities as unique mixtures of Bernoullian probabilities is a special case of a result known as the ergodic decomposition theorem. It says that stationary probability measures are unique mixtures of ergodic measures. Stationarity implies convergence of relative frequencies, and ergodicity the uniqueness of limits. Ergodicity therefore captures exactly the idea of objective probability as a limit of relative frequency (up to a set of measure zero), without the unnecessary restriction to probabilistically independent events as (...) in de Finetti's theorem. The ergodic decomposition has in some applications to dynamical systems a physical content, and de Finetti's reductionist interpretation of his result is not adequate in these cases. (shrink)

In recent years, the research field of the evolution of art has witnessed contributions from a wide range of disciplines across the "three cultures". In this thesis, I make both a critical review of existing explanations, and try to do elucidate the evolution of art by employing insights, methods and concepts from different disciplines. First, I critically evaluate the evidentiary criteria from standard evolutionary psychology some accounts employ to demonstrate that art qualifies as a human biological adaptation. I argue that (...) these criteria do not suffice to make that claim. Furthermore, I make the case for a cultural evolutionary approach to the arts. One commonly used evidentiary criterion for art as adaptation is the “tight fit” between artnbsp;human cognition, which is interpreted as suggesting that cognition has undergone selection to produce and appreciate art. However, disentangling cultural and genetic evolution allows formulating thenbsp;hypothesis that art has evolved culturally to match human cognition. Second, I observe that in ancient and modern hunter gatherer societies, artistic activities are virtually alwaysnbsp;with ritual. I discuss what this implies for the adaptive significance of art. Specifically, if the arts have culturally evolved in function of ritualistic purposes, their adaptive value has depended on the adaptiveness of ritual. Third, because architecture is characterized by the combination of utilitarian and aesthetic aspects, it is particularly interesting from an evolutionary perspective and therefore I devote special attention to it. Employing the cross-species comparative approach, I investigate two main purposes human architecture has in common with nonhuman animal constructions: protection andnbsp;Based on the phylogenetic approach I establish that protection may have been the primary function of building aptitudes in humannbsp;and that building was later co-opted for signaling purposes. Subsequently, I comparatively evaluate thenbsp;of signaling models in the cultural evolution of architectural aesthetics. Furthermore I combine insights from environmental psychology, niche construction and cultural evolution theory to develop the hypothesis that a function of religious monumental architecture may have been to support nbsp;or even to galvanize nbsp;social learning. Finally, I connect the account I developed to the cognitive science of religion. I complement the frequently held view that religious monumental architecture is a costly signal with the mechanism of sensory exploitation. I attempt to demonstrate that by exploiting thenbsp;response of awe in religious followers, religious monumental architecture promotes and regulates prosocial behavior and creates in them an openness to adopt supernatural beliefs. Fourth, I dealnbsp;the evolution of visual art, paying again special attention to cultural evolution andnbsp;explanatory value of sensory exploitation. I assert that the relatively late appearance of figurative art in the course of human evolution may be attributed to an increase in the number of social learning opportunities within and between human populations at that time. I support this assertion with archaeological data that indicate overall population growth and increased population densities at that time. These demographic changes, I argue, have allowed the retention and accumulation of innovations required for figurative art making. Contrary to previous accounts, I furthermore aim to show that this process doesnbsp;require figurative art to have served adaptive purposes. Employing sensory exploitation, I establish that figurative art could have evolved by exploiting pre-existing biases of evolved psychology. The dominant themes of upper Paleolithic and late stone age figurative art, animals and humans, seem to support this contention. Fifth, I present a number of experimental studies I conducted to verify whether contemporary art experts would have socially learned to resist exploitation of evolved psychology. One aspect ofrsquo;s exploitative power may be that it elicits aesthetic pleasure by pushing “pleasure buttons” that evolved for other purposes. Consequently, spectators may trade-off rewards from indulging in art and biological activities, resulting in less effort being allocated to reproduction. I contend that, while the generalnbsp; may indeed be exploited, experts, who are typically being exposed to high doses of art, may have socially learned to resist exploitation by selectively preferring art from prestigious art contexts. The latter would be in line with the claim that prestige bias may trump content biases of evolved psychology. The results of three experimental studies supportnbsp;contention. I find that laypeople's art appreciation is positively affected by a content bias for attractive faces, mediated by aesthetic pleasure, whereas experts' appreciation is positively affected by prestige and mediated by admiration for the artist. Moreover, experts confer lower appreciation to attractive compared to moderately attractive content, which is consistentnbsp;the contention that expertise and the use of prestige are associatednbsp;resistance against beautiful content that exploits evolved preferences. This research thus suggests that expertise moderates content and context biases, which may be of relevance to an ongoing debate about their relative importance as drivers of cultural evolution. In addition, this study provides a tentative but novel explanation for the fact, famously established by philosopher Arthur Danto, that beauty lost its central position in Western art during the 20th century. However my findings cannot exclude alternative explanations for the fact that art expert appreciation deviates from evolved aesthetic preferences. Further research may experimentally assess the role of prestige bias and resistance as drivers of this deviation versus other, previously suggested, potential processes. For example, preferences of experts may deviate on account of the fact that art serves as a badge of elite group membership and thus expert art appreciation as a means to distinguish oneself from the masses. Alternatively, art experts may seek intellectual challenges instead of pushing pleasure buttons. Future research may experimentally verify the respective roles of these different hypothesized mechanisms. In addition, it may be investigated how insights from sexual selection research may help elucidating the different processes at play in cultural evolution and particularly in the cultural evolution of art appreciation, given the commonalities between sexual selection and cultural selection models. (shrink)

This article aims to present a detailed analysis of the “Christian natural philosophy” elaborated by the German humanist philosopher and theologian Otto Casmann (1562–1607) in his various works. To this end, Casmann’s general idea of philosophia Christiana is discussed and critically evaluated. Regarding natural philosophy, or physics, attention is paid mainly to topics such as cosmogony and cosmology, which Casmann promised to have developed biblically and independently of the pagan (namely Aristotelian) tradition. However, when Casmann’s natural philosophy is analyzed in (...) detail, his resolute emphasis on the literal reading of the Bible, the cornerstone of his entire concept, turns out to be problematic. Similarly, despite his resolutions, his natural‑philosophical views are, to a considerable extent, still dependent on Aristotelian terms and concepts. (shrink)

The semantic theory of truth, formulated by Alfred Tarski in the 1939s, is primarily a mathematical theory. On the other hand, it also has a considerable philosophical content. This paper presents the second aspect of this theory. It can be shown that several traditional philosophical issues pertaining to the concept of truth can be illuminated by Tarski’s account of truth. It concerns, for instance, the idea of correspondence, the relation of truth and logic, the problem of the relativity/absoluteness of truth, (...) etc. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the claim that self - love is a precondition for self -knowledge. This claim is relevant to the contemporary philosophical debate on self -knowledge, but mainly because it draws attention to the role of claims of self -knowledge in the larger context of our ordinary practice of rationalizing and appropriating our actions. In this practice it is crucial for persons to open-mindedly investigate the limits of their own responsible agency, an investigation that requires a (...) warm and gentle kindness to avoid both being too easy in welcoming and too merciless in resisting one’s own imperfections as a minded agent. This kindness, I argue, is grounded in an evaluative relation of caring, a type of relation that is incompatible with self -hatred. (shrink)

Firstly, disregarding multiethnicity, it can refer to a philosophy cultivated in a feature of a nation, for instance, its religion or character. This meaning can be illustrated by ext of the distinction between philosophical superpowers and philosophical provinces. Poland is taken as an example. The paper discusses the views of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founding father of the Polish analytic school. He expressed interesting views concerning how philosophy of provinces should be done in order keep its originality.

The thesis is a study of the notion of intuition in the foundations of mathematics which focuses on the case of natural numbers and hereditarily finite sets. Phenomenological considerations are brought to bear on some of the main objections that have been raised to this notion. ;Suppose that a person P knows that S only if S is true, P believes that S, and P's belief that S is produced by a process that gives evidence for it. On a phenomenological (...) view the relevant evidence is provided by intuition , and this should be the case in either ordinary perceptual knowledge or in mathematical knowledge. Intuition is to be understood in terms of fulfillments of intentions. Knowledge is a product of intuition and intention. In the case of mathematical knowledge it is said that there is a construction for a mathematical statement S if and only if the intention expressed by S is fulfilled . Constructions are thus viewed as intuition processes that could actually or possibly be carried out. In elementary parts of mathematics they might be characterized in terms of certain classes of recursive functions. This view is discussed in the case where S is taken to be a singular statement about natural numbers or finite sets, and also where S is taken to be a general statement about such objects. The distinction between intuition of and intuition that is also investigated in this context. ;It is pointed out how on a phenomenological view a number of central problems about mathematical intuition can be avoided: problems about the analogousness of perceptual and mathematical intuition, about causal accounts of knowledge in mathematics, and about structuralism in mathematics. The bearing of the account on issues concerning constructivism and platonism is also discussed. (shrink)

Since the 1990s, Reinhart Koselleck has been one of the critics of the concept of collective memory. This includes contributions to practical debates on the one hand and reflections on a more theoretical level on the other. In contrast, with her concept of cultural memory, Aleida Assmann has taken a more positive view of the concept of collective memory. She defends this concept against Koselleck’s critical remarks, referring to him as an implicit addressee of her reflections. This essay takes this (...) disagreement as an opportunity to look more closely at the ‘dialogue’ between them by addressing three overlapping aspects, primarily on a theoretical level: the distinction between experience and recollection, the collective conditions of recollection, and the opposition between history of memory and memory of history. (shrink)

Humanitarian aid’s psycho-therapeutic turn in the 1990s was mirrored by the increasing emotionalization and subjectivation of fund-raising campaigns. In order to grasp the depth of this interconnectedness, this article argues that in both cases what we see is the post-Fordist production paradigm at work; namely, as Hardt and Negri put it, the direct production of subjectivity and social relations. To explore this, the therapeutic and mental health approach in humanitarian aid is juxtaposed with the more general phenomenon of psychologization. This (...) allows us to see that the psychologized production of subjectivity has a problematic waste-product as it reduces the human to Homo sacer, to use Giorgi Agamben’s term. Drawing out a double matrix of a de-psychologizing psychologization connected to a politicizing de-politicization, it will further become possible to understand psycho-therapeutic humanitarianism as a case of how, in these times of globalization, psychology, subjectivity and money are all interrelated. (shrink)

This article engages the anthropological assumptions underlying the apprehensions and promises associated with language in artificial intelligence (AI). First, we present the contours of two rivalling paradigms for assessing artificial language generation: a holistic-enactivist theory of language and an informational theory of language. We then introduce two language generation models – one presently in use and one more speculative: Firstly, the transformer architecture as used in current large language models, such as the GPT-series, and secondly, a model for 'autonomous machine (...) intelligence' recently proposed by Yann LeCun, which involves not only language but a sensory-motor interaction with the world. We then assess the language capacity of these models from the perspectives of the two rivalling language paradigms. Taking a holistic-enactivist stance, we then argue that there is currently no reason to assume a human-comparable language capacity in LLMs and, further, that LeCun's proposed model does not represent a significant step toward artificially generating human language because it still lacks essential features that underlie the linguistic capacity of humans. Finally, we suggest that proponents of these rivalling interpretations of LLMs should enter into a constructive dialogue and that this dialogue should continuously involve further empirical, conceptual, and theoretical research. (shrink)

This paper is inspired by Marcin Tkaczyk’s works and discusses the problem of the necessity of the past (is the past determined?) and its role in the analysis of future contingents. The discussion centers on the statements (accepted by Tkaczyk, but slightly paraphrased)) firstly, that every past state of affairs is determined, and, secondly, that at least some some future states of affairs are contingent. The paper argues that because the first assertion is not justified, the antinomy of future contingents (...) does not arise. The argument uses modal and metalogical devices. (shrink)

This study articulates the relationship between conceptualisations of time and the accounts of good care in an acute setting. Neoliberal healthcare services, with their focus on efficiencies, predominantly calculate quality care based on time‐on‐the‐clock workforce management planning systems. However, the ways staff conceptualise and then relate to diverse meanings of time have implications for good care and for staff morale. This phenomenological study was undertaken in acute medical–surgical wards, investigating the contextual, temporal nature of care embedded in human relations. The (...) study interviews involved 17 participants: 11 staff, 3 previous patients and 3 family members. Data were analysed iteratively to surface the phenomenality of temporality and good care. The following constituents of the data set are explored that together illustrate the relationship between the conceptualisations of time and the accounts of good care in an acute setting: patient time as a relational journey; patient time, sovereign time and time ethics and time, teamwork and flow. The findings are clinically significant because they offer a contrasting narrative about the relationship between time and care quality. The experiences of giving and receiving good care are indivisible from how temporality is experienced and the social relations within which care is embedded. Healthcare staff experience temporality differently from patients and families, a point that healthcare participants in this study appeared to comprehend and accommodate. For all parties involved in providing care or being the recipient of care, however, the capacity to be present was valued as a humanising ethic of care. Our study reinforces the importance of not creating presumptive binaries about which temporal structures are more or less humanising—there is a place for a fast‐paced tempo, which can be experienced as being in the flow of human relations with one's team and on behalf of patients. (shrink)

April is de Maand van de Filosofie. In deze maand worden door heel Nederland en Vlaanderen filosofische nachten, programma's, lezingen, debatten en festivals georganiseerd rondom het thema van de Maand van de Filosofie. In 2024 is het thema 'chaos' en schrijft Tom-Jan Meeus het filosofisch essay. Twintig jaar domineerde de erfenis van Pim Fortuyn Den Haag. Je kreeg aandachtpolitiek: politiek die er niet was om problemen op te lossen maar die problemen nodig had om de aandacht op politici te vestigen. (...) Je kreeg spektakelleegte: spectaculaire voorstellen of uitspraken die een week later consequentieloos bleken te zijn. Het resulteerde in de paradox van 2023: klassieke partijen probeerden overeind te blijven door kiezers meer zekerheden te beloven, terwijl kiezers klassieke partijen steeds minder zekerheden teruggaven. Je had mensen die voorzagen dat dit ooit in chaos moest eindigen."--Publisher information. (shrink)

Philosophers such as Gettier, Frankfurt, and Thomson are famous for their thought experiments. This makes one wonder: how did they invent their cases? Were they just lucky to devise a good case, or did they follow some basic rules that are available to all of us? In this paper, we argue for the latter answer by presenting a guidebook for analysing thought experiments. Our guidebook clearly specifies which factors should be included in a thought experiment, and which factors should be (...) left out. This will help students to see through the fantastical elements of TEs, to learn the practice, and to check whether philosophers are doing things right. We illustrate our account in some detail using examples from Thomson’s thought experiments. (shrink)

When there are equally strong claimants for a scarce good, lotteries are often argued to be a fair method of allocation. This paper reproduces four of the views on the fairness of lotteries that have been presented in the literature: the distributive view; the preference view; the actual consent view; and the expressive view. It argues that these four views cannot offer plausible explanations for the fairness of lotteries. The distributive view is argued to be inadequate because, even though receiving (...) expectations to a good is of value to the participants, this value cannot plausibly make a contribution to the satisfaction of a participant’s claim. Both the preference and actual consent views are argued to be implausible because they lead to accepting procedures as legitimate that fail to correspond with what a claim is. Finally, it is contended that the expressive view identifies a value that is relevant to respecting equal claimants, but that cannot plausibly be related to a procedure’s fairness. The paper concludes by maintaining that an equal treatment view can accept all the valid insights from these four views without needing to accept their untenable implications. (shrink)

This paper critically discusses two points concerning some recent views about the concept of truth. Firstly, contrary to Davidson, it shows that meaning of sentences cannot be explicated by T-equivalences. In particular, “is true” is an extensional predicate, but “means that” an intensional one. Secondly, the minimalist account of truth does not provide a satisfactory analysis of the concept of falsity. In this respect, minimalism does not satisfy Russell’s claim that any adequate truth-theory must be a theory of falsity as (...) well. (shrink)

Auf die im Jahre 1938 entwickelte allgemeine Gleichung derMendel Gesetze bezugnehmend, die die Vererbung als Ausdruck desNewtonschen Binoms hält, sucht der Verfasser dieselbe auf die Geschlechtsvererbung anzuwenden, indem er, sich des transformiertenPascal'schen arithmetischen Dreiecks bedienend, zum Schluss kommt, dass die ungeschlechtliche Vermehrung, vom rein biometrischen Standpunkt aus betrachtet, als Beispiel der Zero-Potenz in dem Kreuzungsrange angesehen werden könnte, d.h. eine komplette Konsolidierung und Homozygotie, bei alledem vielleicht sekundär aus der früher durchgemachten geschlechtlichen Vermehrung entstanden, darstellte.Die geschlechtliche Vermehrung müsste sodann etwa (...) für ein Beispiel des Binoms, wenn auch von nicht reiner, aber deformierter oder verkümmerter Form, von einer Kreuzungspotenzn=1 angesehen werden, und zwar vom Typus .Zudem wird ein weiterer Versuch gemacht, von demselben Standpunkt aus, auch einige kompliziertere Geschlechtserscheinungen zu analysieren, wie die des Geschlechtspolymorphismus , des Hermaphroditismus , so wie auch die oft in den natürlichen Populationen beobachtbaren Verschiebungen in der üblichen Zahlproportion 1 ∶ 1 der Geschlechter .In relation to the general equation of the laws ofMendel, given by the author in 1938, as forming the expression ofNewton's binomial, the author analyses the possibilities of application of this equation to the phenomena of sex inheritance and, while usingPascal's transformed arithmetical triangle, comes to the conclusion that the asexual propagation might be taken, from the purely biometrical point of view, as an instance of Zero-power of the crosses, which would mean a complete consolidation or homozygoty of germ material, acquired, it is true, as a secondary achievement from the previous sexual propagation.The latter, again, ought to be considered as an instance ofNewton's binomial of the cross power ofn=1 of a rather irregular, disfigured type of .Then, the author is making an attempt of analysing, from this point of view, a few more complicated cases from this field of inquiry, such as sexual polymorphism , hermaphroditism and finally the fluctuations in the number proportions of sexes, found in natural populations. (shrink)

This article reveals that explanatory practice in software engineering is in accordance with pragmatic explanatory pluralism, which states that explanations should at least partially be evaluated by their practical use. More specifically, I offer a defense of the idea that several explanation-types are legitimate in software engineering, and that the appropriateness of an explanation-type depends on (a) the engineer’s interests, and (b) the format of the explanation-seeking question he asks, with this format depending on his interests. This idea is defended (...) by considering examples that are representative for explanatory practice in software engineering. Different kinds of technological explanation are spelled out, and the dependence of their appropriateness on interests and question-formats is extensively illustrated. (shrink)

The results of an empirical study of 150 justifications of verdicts of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal are discussed. CT justifies its decisions mostly on authoritative references to previous decisions and other doxa- type arguments. It thus does not convince the audience of a decision's validity, but rather documents it. Further, the methodology changes depending on features of the case. The results are analysed using a conceptual framework of sociological systems theory. It is shown that CT's justification methodology ignores the redundancy (...) of the legal system, finding redundancy redundant. This is a risky strategy of decision- making, enabling political influence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Treatise of the Three Impostors and the Problem of Enlightenment: A New Translation of the Traité des trois Imposteurs by Abraham AndersonJan W. WojcikAbraham Anderson. The Treatise of the Three Impostors and the Problem of Enlightenment: A New Translation of the Traité des trois Imposteurs. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997. Pp. xiv + 165. Cloth, $52.50. Paper, $21.95.This work results from a seminar, organized by (...) Richard H. Popkin, sponsored by the Foundation for Intellectual History, and held in Leiden in 1990, in which various [End Page 368] aspects of the history and significance of the Traité de trois Imposteurs were studied. As the title of the work indicates, it contains an English translation of the Traité. It also contains three short essays of commentary (the second of which is a modified version of Anderson’s contribution to the volume of essays which resulted from the Leiden seminar, Heterodoxy, Spinozism and Free Thought in Early Eighteenth Century Europe: Studies on the Traité des trois Imposteurs, edited by S. Berti, F. Charles-Daubert, and R. H. Popkin). There is a select bibliography, but no index.The Treatise consists of a critique of revelation (which is exposed as a fiction of the imagination), along with a discussion of the ways in which claims to revelation made by crafty politicians have enslaved humankind. It also includes scurrilous stories about three of the main alleged impostors: Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, as well as a more philosophical discussion of God, the soul, and demons.The translation is of Pierre Rétat’s 1973 edition of the 1777 edition of the Traité. This edition was chosen out of a number of virtually identical editions because it is accompanied by three very brief documents related to the Treatise (“Sentiments Concerning the Treatise of the Three Impostors: Extract of a Letter or Dissertation of Mr. de La Monnoye on this Subject,” a “Response to the Dissertation of Mr. de La Monnoye,” and a “Copy of Article IX of the Second Part of the First Volume of the Mémoires de Littérature”). Anderson’s reasons for selecting this edition are sound. The accompanying documents are of interest in their own right; in addition, they are the focus of Anderson’s essays of commentary and are (as he claims) necessary for a proper understanding of the significance of the Treatise. Although earlier English translations exist (1844, reprinted 1846, reprinted 1904) they are either not readily available or are not reliable in that the manuscript original is not readily identifiable. Hence Anderson’s translation is a welcome addition to the literature for those (both specialists and nonspecialists) whose circumstances do not permit a study of the 1777 French edition.The first two essays of commentary concern political issues, as indicated by their inclusion in “Part I: The Politics of the Traité des trois Imposteurs.” In the first, entitled “On a Section of Prosper Marchand’s Private Catalogue,” Anderson refutes the claim made by Margaret C. Jacob in The Radical Enlightenment that a section of Prosper Marchand’s library catalogue shows that Marchand considered the Traité to be in the tradition of Protestant radicalism and republicanism. After a careful analysis of the works listed in this section of the catalogue, Anderson concludes that (with one exception) the books in this section constitute a bibliography of works that “either exemplify the uses of literary study for the defense of orthodoxy or belong to a literary tradition of the cynical study of those uses, or consist in a parody and public exposure of that cynical study” (81). In the second essay, “Sallengre, La Monnoye, and the Traité des trois Imposteurs,” Anderson argues that rather than being a work of radical propaganda, the Traité was part of a satirical campaign against the “conformist libertine intelligentia” (x) of Louis XIV—those who believed that the fact of imposture ought not become public knowledge because they believed that religion ought to serve to enforce the rights of monarchy.“Part 2: Philosophy in the Traité des trois Imposteurs” consists of a single essay, “Descartes the Impostor, Bayle, and the Hidden Origins of Enlightenment.” Here, Anderson explores puzzling aspects of the... (shrink)

This paper presents the development of Ajdukiewicz’s conception of analytic sentences. Starting from his pre-war radical conventionalism, the presentation proceeds to Ajdukiewicz’s moderate aposteriorism and, finally, to radical aposteriorism. Various accounts of analyticity by Ajdukiewicz are mentioned and briefly commented on. At the end of the paper, Ajdukiewicz’s influence on Polish philosophy in regard to the issue of analyticity is pointed out.

Roman Ingarden offered a strong criticism of the verifiability principle in his talk delivered at the 8th International Congress in Prague in 1934. Ingarden argued that this principle either violates itself or smuggles a hidden sense. In this paper I show that Ingarden-like arguments about smuggled (but this pejorative qualification is skipped) meaning apply not only to the criteria of sense, but also to other semantic assertions within language-hierarchies in Tarski’s sense.

This paper outlines the history of logic in Poland in the years 1918–1939 . The disciplinary and social history of logical investigations in Poland is widely described. The author stresses topics characteristic for Polish logic, namely prepositional calculus, many-valued logic, Lezśniewski's systems, Chwistek's systems and the works in the history of logic.

This paper proposes a formal framework for the cognitive relation understood as an ordered pair with the cognitive subject and object of cognition as its members. The cognitive subject is represented as consisting of a language, conequence relation and a stock of accepted theories, and the object as a model of those theories. This language allows a simple formulation of the realism/anti-realism controversy. In particular, Tarski’s undefinability theorem gives a philosophical argument for realism in epistemology.

Les débats qui ont eu lieu, lors du Congrès de philosophie scientifique de 1935, sur la sémantique et sa portée philosophique présentent un grand intérêt historique pour deux raisons. Tout d’abord, on s’accorde à y reconnaître un des évènements majeurs du congrès. En second lieu, et de façon plus substantielle, ils ont joué un rôle décisif dans le développement de la sémantique comme discipline philosophique. C’est Carnap qui en a pris l’initiative en invitant Tarski à donner deux conférences. Ce sont (...) eux qui, avec Kokoszyńska, deviendront les porte-parole de la sémantique. Neurath, qui a préparé le résumé de la discussion, avait plusieurs objections contre la sémantique à la Tarski. En particulier, il craignait que la sémantique n’introduise la métaphysique (au sens que les Viennois donnaient au mot) dans la philosophie. La suite a montré que les partisans de la sémantique ont gagné. (shrink)

The article is an attempt to outline a new paradigm of thinking, contained in the dialogical “you are.” Józef Tischner creatively developed ideas of Buber and Levinas. He claimed that in the face of “death of a man” there is a need to search for new ways of rescuing our humanity. The philosophy of drama starts from a question, which is a “cry of pain” in the presence of evil. A man — according to Nietzsche’s discovery — looks for power, (...) understood by Tischner as a “grace,” which is a specific good. Forces of good and evil influence a man both in a constructive and destructive way. A desire for unlimited power inevitably appears in the depth of a human heart. Evil, as a false power, reveals itself both in the individual and social aspect. Dehumanized global structures grow today as “systems of evil.” The agathological drama is being realized also in the dimension of faith and unbelief, in the sphere of the division between faith and mind. The “resurrection” of man is possible owing to meeting with another person whose dignity and beauty one may discover no matter how different he is. In the civilization of work the man is often treated as a tool, an instrument for egoistic benefit. The agathological philosophy aims to be a way of thinking attached to a specific man, while it looks for a key and a solution to a drama of a man, entangled in the system of work, consumption, empty hopes and pseudo-values. This philosophical thought has great potential to diagnose our times, which is the first step on the way to the “transformation of all values.” Key words GOOD, EVIL, AGATHOLOGY, REASON, FAITH. (shrink)

In the paper the author provides a brief sketch of Albert the Great as a scientist. By quoting passages from his works he shows that Albert the Great had a well-elaborated understanding of science. It is argued that in some aspects Albert was not too far from modern criteria that science and its methodology should meet. Accepting Aristotelian model of science, Albert stressed the need for experience and repeated observation in scientific research. While valuing authority, he examined carefully what it (...) was stating and was not afraid to criticize even such an important authority as Aristotle, if his claims contradicted Albert’s observations. Although science was in close relation with theology, it wasn’t limited in its research and on the methodological level Albert was well aware of the need for their mutual independence. He was not afraid of providing science with freedom of inquiry, because he knew that in principle science and theology, if both sound, couldn’t contradict itself, because there is just one truth known from their different perspectives. The article also introduces Albert’s understading of and major contributions to mineralogy, astronomy, astrology, alchemy and other disciplines that were considered scientific in his time. (shrink)

The theory of double truth was proposed in the Middle Age by Latin Averroists as a solution of how the relation between faith (religion, theology) and reason (science) should be conceived. In general terms, according to this theory, there are two orders, one dictated by faith and second dictated by reason. Both are epistemologically different and cannot mutually remain in logical relations such as (in)consistency or entailment. This view was used in the Middle Ages for defending science against a claim (...) that it is the ancilla thelogiae only. The author compares the theory of double truth with other solutions like the model of identity of science and theology or the model of two overlapping regions (Thomas Aquinas). It is argued that the substantial difference of the language of faith and the language of reason makes logical relations between statements of science and statements of theology impossible. In particular, all cosmological proofs of God's existence as well as projects of intelligent design fail if the theory of double truth is adopted. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic creates an unprecedented threatening situation worldwide with an urgent need for critical reflection and new knowledge production, but also a need for imminent action despite prevailing knowledge gaps and multilevel uncertainty. With regard to the role of research ethics in these pandemic times some argue in favor of exceptionalism, others, including the authors of this paper, emphasize the urgent need to remain committed to core ethical principles and fundamental human rights obligations all reflected in research regulations and (...) guidelines carefully crafted over time. In this paper we disentangle some of the arguments put forward in the ongoing debate about Covid-19 human challenge studies (CHIs) and the concomitant role of health-related research ethics in pandemic times. We suggest it might be helpful to think through a lens differentiating between risk, strict uncertainty and ignorance. We provide some examples of lessons learned by harm done in the name of research in the past and discuss the relevance of this legacy in the current situation. (shrink)

This paper presents the ethical nihilism that looms in the condition of sex in the posthuman. It takes over from the backdrop of Hauskeller’s description of the singularity as having a “glorious sex life.” While such a condition is heavily leaning towards hedonistic ethics, the paper critiques that it merely masks nihilistic ethics. The pleasurable picture of ‘happy rapists’ and ‘masturbatory sex’ in posthumanity with sexual affluence faces a disturbing nothingness that caters to the extreme possibility of being sexless. Following (...) from Žižek’s exposition of Houellebecq’s novel The Elementary Particles, which runs counter to Houellebecq’s later novel The Possibility of an Island, the posthuman poses paradoxes that point to a nihilistic ethical domain. Later, the paper presents two paradoxes: First, the paradox of hedonism or happiness, and second, the paradox of wealth or nothingness. (shrink)

The ongoing legal and bioethics debates on consent requirements for collecting, storing, and utilizing human biological material for purposes of basic and applied research—that is, genomic research biobanking—have already managed to pass through three ostensibly dissimilar stages.

An inquiry into the bioethical or ethical component of post-humanism can be through the question of sex. Following from Manoj’s idea of a cyborg as having a “sexless” possibility, this paper presents other arguments that advance the possibility of asexuality in the posthuman. First, I begin with a discussion of Žižek’s point concerning the cessation or voiding of sexual difference. Second, I will continue such an argument through the selfreplicating possibilities of cloning and full cyberspace immersion, the later as prototyped (...) by Pokémon. And finally, there seems to be an inevitable thread that begs to link the concept of the posthuman to Nietzsche; so I will explore some of the arguments that include or exclude Nietzschean ethics in this prospect. (shrink)